Wage shares have fallen substantially in Europe since the early 1980s. To some extent this is due to a macroeconomic policy package that encourages wage flexibility and wage competition. A system of wage coordination in the Euro area would facility a return to a productivity-oriented wage policy by reducing wage competition. In a recent study on the demand effects of changes in functional income distribution Stockhammer, Onaran und Ederer (2007) find that the Euro area is in a wage-led demand regime. According to their results a reduction of the wage share by 1%-point leads to a reduction of demand by around 0.2%-points of GDP. This finding has far reaching implications for economic policy. A stable wage share would help stabilize demand. The paper aims, first, at clarifying some conceptual issues in the design of a European system of productivity-oriented wage coordination and, second, it discusses the economic policy implications of wage coordination. The present policy package assigns wages the role of a shock absorber. However, as wage reductions do have negative demand effects in a wage-led demand regime, this policy has a deflationary bias. A system of wage coordination will thus have to be complemented by a more active nation fiscal policies and more fiscal redistribution within the EU. If so a regime of productivity oriented wage coordination will help to stabilize demand and it is consistent with price stability.
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Wage Flexibility or Wage Coordination? Economic Policy Implications of the Wage-led Demand Regime in the Euro Area
Functional income distribution has shifted dramatically in the past 25 years. The wage share in the Euro area has fallen by ten percentage points since 1981. This is the outcome of economic forces like globalization and technical change, but it has also been the result of deliberate policy pursued by the European Commission (EC) and by some national governments. Despite this drastic fall in wages relative to productivity unemployment has not decreased substantially. It is still higher than it was in 1981. The recommendations of the OECD and the EC to fight unemployment center around making labor markets more flexible. Wages should respond to national (or regional) conditions and increasing wage inequality is explicitly recommended.
Wage moderation is regarded as golden way out of unemployment. 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 Adjusted Wage Share ven down wages and wage moderation has contributed to depressed domestic demand. As the policies of labor market flexibility have proven unable to cure unemployment and stabilize income distribution, an alternative strategy is needed. Wage coordination across countries and sectors could help take competitive pressure off the shoulders of wage bargainers and would thereby be an important precondition for a re-establishing of productivity-oriented wage polic Indeed the following discussion of wage coordination refers to productivity-oriented wage coordination.
1 The aim of this paper is, first, to clarify potential problems in the design of a coordinated productivity oriented wage policy at the European level. Second, the paper aims highlighting that wage coordination is inconsistent with the present policy regime, which crucially relies on wage flexibility. A discussion of the political economy of wage coordin (Niechoj 2004 , Schulten 2004 or its political feasibility is beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper first summarizes factors that have contributed to the decline in the wage s two discusses demand effects of wage moderation. Section three discusses possible designs of wage coordination. Section four summarizes the present policy regime of the EU the central role of wage flexibility therein. Section five outlines a policy regime for monetary and fiscal policy that could complement a regime of wage coordination. to which the abundant factor, that is capital in the European case, will gain) there will also be bargaining effects. The mobile factor will benefit from liberalization because unlike the immob factor it will take advantage of new opportunities (Rodrik 1997) . As capital is more mobile than labor, the bargaining power of capital should increase, which will translate into an increase in wage elasticities of labor demand. Indeed Hatzius (2000) and OECD (2007) find that labor demand in Europe has become more elastic.
Second, it has been a policy goal of the EU for many years to reduce the wage share. The
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for many years included that »real wage developments s be below the increase in productivity« (EC 19
ines recommend »real wage increases in line with the underlying rate of productivity growth over the medium term,« but are clearly more worried about wage growth rising above trend productivity than falling below (EC 2005: 15) .
Third, there has been a series of national ›wage pacts‹ in the form of tripartite agreem that had wage moderation at their core, complemented by a policy package that made it more attractive to labor unions (Schulten 2004 
Demand Effects of Changes in Functional Income Distribution
So far we have been concerned with t e various components of aggregate demand in different directions. Fir depressing effect on (private) consumption expenditures because wage income is typically associated with a higher consumption propensity than profit income. Secondly, it will have an expansionary effect on investment as profitability is rising. Thirdly, it will have a positive e on net exports because the falling wage share is equivalent to a fall in unit labor costs which measure of price competitiveness. The overall or net effect is thus a priori indeterminate and depends on the specific size of the respective effects (Blecker: 1999, Bhaduri/Marglin 1990). 
ominal wage growth, w stands for growth of labor productivity, p is the inflation rate and p The aim of the ETUC is that wages should be oriented and the European inflation target of the ECB. This implies that national labor unions should have a strong eye on European developments, which reduces their scope of action with respect to national developments, which is why in the present policy regime unions will be reluctant to submit to such a regime. It would imply that Greek and Spanish workers would compensated for the ECB inflation target rather than for their actual inflation rates (which are 3 Note that wage policy could aim at either a convergence of competitiveness or at a convergence of living standards.
Only if structural policies (such as fiscal support for countries) were to ensure a convergence of productivity across countries, would the two be consistent. 8 higher). Unsurprisingly such a system meets with resistance. With Eastern enlargement the tension will increase further. Assuming that Central and Eastern European economies will ca up, they are also likely to experience higher inflation rates than the EU average. Without further adjustment mechanism the wage share would thus fall in these countries.
There is thus need to refine the ETUC's wage formula, though it ca However, adjustment through wages is socially costly an are never perfectly flexible, an adjustment through wages usually requires substantial amounts of unemployment, which involves high social and personal costs. Second, if demand wage-led in the EU, then flexible wages will send perverse signals in the case of adverse demand shocks. Rather than stimulating demand, falling wages (or more precisely falling wage shares)
will dampen demand further. While it may work in one country, this will have negative (deman externalities for other countries and it does not work for the EU as a whole.
Therefore the whole design of the policy package in Europe has to be modifie would have to get reoriented to output stabilization or fiscal policy would need more room (and coordination) for counter-cyclical policy, in particular in the face of asymmetric shocks.
A
A system of EU-wide wage coord regime that put shock absorbers other than wages in place. 4 Exchange rate policy, which use serve as a shock absorber, is irrevocably gone. Monetary policy can do little to address asymmetric developments within the union. 5 The main burden of adjustment would cert with (national) fiscal policy, which would have to be more pro-active to address imbalances. An expanded system of (automatic) fiscal transfers from fast growing to slow growing regions would be an obvious system.
The present syst ourages only deficit, but not surplus countries to adjust. A system of wage coordination on the other hand would spread the burden more equally in that the surplus countries (assuming that they have a lower inflation rate), would automatically provide some of the adjustment via incorporating the (higher) European rather than the (lower) national inflation in its wage 4 The policy package is similar to that suggested by Hein and Truger (2004) . Theoretical aspects of this policy mix are discussed (in a single country setting) by Hein and Stockhammer (2007) . Arestis et al. (2001) The economic performance resulting from this policy has been disappointing. Wage shares have declined substantially and unemploym en diverging since the introduction of the Euro. A system of productivity-oriented coordinated wage bargaining would contribute to achieving the policy goals of an equitable distribution of income, to stabilize demand and to guarantee price stability. As regards the distribution of income, wage coordination could contribute to stabilizing the wage share as w competition is reduced. As a stable (or rising) wage share has expansionary demand effects would help maintaining the economy at full capacity. Finally, as long as wage coordination is productivity oriented is consistent with price stability. It would also help prevent price divergences across countries. 
